NEIL McCABE: Bahrain, Home of the Fifth Fleet, Iran’s Fifth Column

In January, the U.S. Navy broke ground on a new $16 million unaccompanied sailor barracks in Manama, Bahrain’s capital, signaling that Naval Support Activity Bahrain would continue to host the Fifth Fleet’s command-and-control headquarters, as well as the significant shipyard and logistics capabilities supporting the fleet.

Then came Operation Epic Fury.

The operation targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran, which immediately targeted U.S. forces and assets in the region, including Bahrain.

Now, there is evidence that members of the Sunni kingdom’s Shia majority are working for the Iranians behind the lines—a phenomenon that is not new. In 2011, there was a failed pro-Iranian uprising, and more seriously, in 2018, Bahraini authorities arrested 116 operatives tied to Iran.

In the 2018 roundup, the operatives were charged with plotting assassinations of government officials, sabotage of oil facilities and attacks on military personnel. Security forces seized explosives, weapons and ammunition, as well as sites dedicated to munitions manufacturing and storage.

Given the increased possibility of hostilities with Iran, the Army closed three bases in Qatar in 2021 and moved personnel and assets to Kuwait and Jordan.

Yet, given the same prognosis of an Iranian conflict, coupled with a disaffected Shia population in Bahrain, the Navy decided to stay put and build.

Fifth Fleet functions as U.S. Central Command’s Navy, so it is also Naval Forces Central Command, or NAVCENT, in much the same way that Third Army, with its main command post at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, and its operational command post at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, functions as Army Central.

The headquarters are in the Juffair district of the capital, while ship maintenance and logistics are based at Mina Salman port. The Navy also uses Shaikh Isa Air Base to support its P-8A Poseidon maritime surveillance and reconnaissance operations.

All of that was attacked by the Iranians.

By the end of March, NAVCENT and Bahraini authorities had evacuated personnel from the facilities at Juffair. Subsequent attacks on Mina Salman damaged the facilities, but most significantly, the port has been taken off the board as a logistics port of call because it is an active target.

As the Navy was moving civilians and nonessential personnel out of the capital and away from military targets, Bahrain’s government announced the arrests of two pro-Iranian spy rings accused of feeding Iran on-the-ground targeting information.

The first was wrapped up March 12 with the arrests of four Bahrainis and a fifth suspect identified as a fugitive living abroad. The five men are accused of using high-resolution cameras to take photographs of military targets embedded with geolocation data and then transmitting the photos to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps using encrypted software.

Bahraini authorities arrested a second cell accused of taking photographs of military targets on March 15, this time involving five men and a sixth living overseas. The cell’s leader, Abbas Abdullah Habbib, is described as a professional terrorist with IRGC training and operational experience.

Another 14 pro-Iranian operatives remain at large but have been referred to the court system for allegedly gathering intelligence for the Islamic Republic and moving Iranian funds to support espionage.

In May, Bahraini authorities dismantled another IRGC-related ring involving 41 individuals allegedly taking directions from 11 Iranian handlers.

The crackdown on Iranian agents has led to the arrest of more than 300 individuals accused of acting in different roles, from gathering intelligence and recruiting new agents to posting on social media in celebration of Iranian attacks.

All of this calls into question the wisdom of keeping Fifth Fleet in Bahrain at all.

The kingdom’s political and cultural divide makes it a breeding ground for local pro-Iranian resistance or an underground movement—now a complication, but after the Third Gulf War ends, it could become a war-college case study in lessons learned.