SSP History: Patton’s Third Army Drives Across France

“We could push on to the German frontier and rupture that goddamned Siegfried Line. I’m willing to stake my reputation on that.”

“Careful, George, that reputation of yours hasn’t been worth very much.”

Patton stated with a smile, “That reputation is pretty good now.”

— Generals Dwight D. Eisenhower and George S. Patton, September 2, 1944

General Omar N. Bradley was not in favor of having Patton under his authority, as the leadership roles had previously been reversed in North Africa and Sicily. But Bradley felt the pressure to gain results, and Patton was feared by the German Wehrmacht. Whereas both men had completely different fighting styles, it was in Bradley’s interest to utilize the talents of this controversial but capable armor commander to earn victories.

During the drive across France, Patton proved to be everywhere as he motivated his troops to continually contest the enemy and push forward at all times. Pressure was the key, as Patton ordered that his forces were not to worry about their “flanks,” and they were not permitted to allow any rest for the Wehrmacht. Patton was in the “doghouse” until he arrived in Normandy. Now he operated at will against the Germans and demonstrated to Eisenhower and General George C. Marshall that they were wise to keep him in command.

After the ports in Brittany were cleared and opened for Allied supplies, Patton ordered his forces eastward. Some of Patton’s own officers felt that it was a waste of time and supplies to open the French coastal ports. But Patton was in a vulnerable position, as he was unable to oppose Bradley and Eisenhower over the mission to take Brittany.

Later, at Falaise, Patton advocated for closing the gap, but Bradley ordered him to halt. Patton argued that more soldiers could be captured and killed and that, by not pursuing the enemy, they would live to fight another day. Bradley feared that American and Canadian forces were dangerously close to one another and could possibly cause friendly Allied losses. Patton was pleased to be leading the Third Army, but his position was not solid enough for him to contest the fighting orders of Bradley and Eisenhower.

The Germans suffered numerous losses from the strength of the Third Army, and they also had to defend against Operation Anvil-Dragoon on August 15, 1944. This second front was expanded by landing forces in southern France from the Mediterranean Sea, severely straining German resources. Although the British were against these landings, Allied forces quickly secured this part of France and headed northward toward the Swiss and German borders. While the Germans were willing to fight the Allies viciously, their position in France quickly dissolved, as they were unable to stem the tide of the Third Army. Patton was pleased with the progress of his forces, but he continually motivated his soldiers to keep pressuring the enemy.

The war entered a new phase that saw Patton’s strategy differ from those of Eisenhower, Bradley and Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery. His finest attribute as a commander was pursuit. As long as he had enough fuel and supplies, the Germans were unable to defeat him during the late summer of 1944. Patton was not interested in politics, detested Montgomery, felt that Bradley did not understand the fighting situation and believed Eisenhower was too conservative on the battlefield.

On the Eastern Front, the Soviets were in Polish territory, and the war was moving increasingly closer to the Third Reich’s border. The aggressiveness that Patton directed toward the enemy was also directed toward his own staff, as he ordered a division commander to move his forces some 50 miles in one day.

Patton stressed to his army not to worry about its flanks and to keep pursuing the enemy. If his forces were successful, the Germans would not be able to support one another in battle and would be easier to defeat. Whereas Patton utilized “bravado” as motivation, he also utilized the intelligence system to determine the strength and location of the enemy as he issued his orders.

This strategy of advocating a total forward pursuit of the Germans paid dividends. By August 26, the Wehrmacht had suffered substantial losses of 136,500 men, compared with 18,239 members of the Third Army. German armor lost 4,353 tanks, while Patton’s soldiers continually liberated towns from Nazi control. By September 1944, the German war effort continued to face hardships on the battlefield, losing 900,000 men on the Eastern Front and 450,000 against the Allies in the West.

The victories achieved by the Third Army helped Paris fall more quickly to the Allies. On August 22, 1944, Eisenhower ordered Allied forces to help liberate the city as the resistance fought against the Germans. It was feared that if no reinforcements were sent, these French fighters would be killed.

Many military leaders believed that the capture of Paris would slow the eastward advance. Eisenhower ordered General Philippe François Marie Leclerc’s 2nd Armored Division to be the first troops to enter the beleaguered city. Leclerc’s progress against the Germans was slow, and Bradley had to order American reinforcements to support the assault into the city. Within a brief amount of time, the Allied drive helped free Paris after four years of German control.

By September 1944, the Third Army’s advance was limited by a lack of fuel reaching its eastward lines across France. The Allies consumed 800,000 gallons per day, while the Third Army used 350,000 gallons a day. While this resource was ashore at Normandy, there were not enough trucks to keep pace with the rapid pursuit of American armor, which had outpaced its supply lines.

Patton desperately wanted to make a dash toward the Siegfried Line and wanted Eisenhower to shift fuel to him so he could defeat the Germans before they had time to regroup near their border.

(Next week: Patton’s Third Army drives toward the German frontier.)